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Abstract In our model, the government operates a mandatory proportional (DC)
pension system to substitute for the low life-cycle savings of the lower-paid my-
opic workers, while maintaining the incentives of the higher-paid far-sighted ones
in contributing to the system. The introduction of an appropriate cap on pen-
sion contribution (or its base)—excluding the earnings above the cap from the
contribution base—raises the optimal contribution rate, helping more the lower-
paid myopic workers and reserving enough room for the saving of higher-paid
far-sighted ones. The social welfare is almost independent of the cap in a rela-
tively wide interval but the maximal welfare is higher than the capless welfare by
0.3–4.5%.
Keywords: proportional (DC) pensions, contribution rate, contribution cap,
maximum for taxable earnings
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1 Introduction
The revenue of any pension system depends primarily on two factors: on the con-
tribution rate and the cap (on the contribution base) above which workers do
not pay further contributions. These two factors vary in the three pillars: public,
mandatory private and voluntary private in a given country in a given year (World
Bank, 1994). Confining our attention to the public system, the contribution rates
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and caps also vary across countries and years.1 The contribution rate affects every
worker, while a cap high enough only influences a minority, i.e. the highest-earners.
Nevertheless, due to the strong inequality in earnings, the share of total earnings
above the cap is much higher than the share of the corresponding workers.
While the literature has devoted a lot of attention to the contribution rate, it
has almost totally neglected the cap. To analyze the problem, in the present paper I
set up a simple OLG model, where the workers pay pension contributions (up to the
cap) yielding a proportional (DC) benefit and may also (privately) save for their old
age. To reflect the problems caused by restrained labor supply and underreported
earnings, it is assumed that the private saving is more efficient than the public one
(cf. Barr and Diamond (2008, Chapter 6) on its limited validity). Here a continuum
of workers with heterogeneous wages and discount factors (the latter being an
increasing function of the former) determine their savings under a credit constraint
to maximize their discounted lifetime utility. Anticipating the workers’ insufficient
savings, the government maximizes a paternalistic social welfare function (without
discounting the old-age consumption’s utility) by choosing the contribution rate
and the cap.
For totally myopic workers, the rise in the contribution rate raises their pa-
ternalistic utility, at least until the old-age consumption reaches the young-age
consumption at zero saving. We shall call this equalizing rate myopic. For totally
far-sighted workers, however, any rise in the contribution rate diminishes their wel-
fare. Depending on the distribution of the workers’ characteristics and the value
of the external parameters like interest factor, the socially optimal contribution
rate will be close to or far from the myopic rate. It is also possible that the wel-
fare function first declines, then rises and then again declines. In such a case, the
government must jump the arising welfare gap when choosing the contribution rate.
Before turning to the second key parameter, we normalize the average wage
to unity, giving the cap a standard value (in terms of the average wage). As-
suming that the cap is between the minimum and the maximum wages, its exis-
tence reduces the effective contribution rate—the ratio of the contribution to the
earning—of those who earn above the cap. In a proportional system with high
enough contribution rate, for the lower-paid short-sighted workers the resulting
high effective contribution rate ensures sufficient public pension and the result-
ing low enough effective contribution rate leaves enough room for the higher-paid
far-sighted ones.2
The apparently simple model is too complicated to obtain sharp analytic re-
sults. I must often rely on numerical illustrations, using Pareto wage distribution
(Diamond and Saez, 2011). Since the model is very rudimentary, there is no point
to calibrate it. Nevertheless, similarly to Pestieau and Ponthiere (2014), but devi-
ating from others, at least I scaled down the old-age stage rather than identified
its length with that of the working stage.
1 Recently, the US Social Security contribution rate is as low as 12.4%, while in Italy it
is as high as 34%. There are a number of causes of this difference, e.g. the higher systemic
dependency in Italy and the stronger redistribution in the US, see Disney (2004). Taking the
average gross wage as unity, the cap is as low as 1.3 in Sweden and as high as 2.5 in the US,
cf. also Table 1 in Valde´s-Prieto and Schwarzhaupt (2011). Lovell (2009) gives a useful dataset
and analysis of the long and sometimes turbulent history of the US Social Security.
2 The lowered contribution rate for the self employed can be explained along this line, too,
but in fact, it stems from the difficulties of auditing rather than paternalistic differentiation.
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I hope that the combination of analytics and numerical illustrations helps the
reader understand the message: in addition to the contribution rate, the choice
of the cap is also important. Measuring social welfare with respect to the no
pension, we shall use its transformation, called efficiency, i.e. a scalar by which
multiplying every worker’s earning, the no pension system gives the same social
welfare as the pension system does with the original earnings. Figure 1 illustrates
the dependence of efficiency on the contribution rate for three different caps: the
minimal cap (diamond, 0.5), the optimal cap (square, here the average wage) and
the maximal one which is effectively no cap (triangle). It can be seen that the
optimal cap’s curve is quite flat around the myopic rate (τ¯ = 1/3), which is its
optimum argument. The maximal (i.e. no) cap’s curve lies definitely below the
optimal one, and attains its optimum slightly earlier. It is remarkable that for the
minimal cap, the efficiency curve is rising farther and only reaches its maximum
around 0.4, but remains below the maximum.
Having outlined the present paper, we turn to the review of the literature. In
the empirical literature relatively little explanation has been given on the desir-
ability of a cap. As a rare exception, Barr and Diamond (2008, p. 63) mention two
roles for the cap. First, in some countries, the cap only applies to the employee’s
contribution and to the proportional benefit, therefore from an economic point of
view—assuming that the employer’s contribution is eventually also paid by the
employee—the employer’s contribution above the cap is essentially a hidden per-
sonal income tax.3 Similarly, for progressive benefits, the cap limits the otherwise
3 In Hungary, the former contribution rate is 10% of the gross wage, while the latter is 24%.
Until 2013, the uncapped contributions alone provided 6% of the total pension contributions
and gave 10% of the de facto personal income tax. From 2013, there is no cap at all, decreasing
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unbounded redistribution from the higher-paid workers to the lower-paid ones.4
Second, the government has no mandate to force high old-age consumption on
high-earners and in a proportional pension system, removing the cap would fur-
ther increase the perverse redistribution from the poor to the rich caused by the
strong correlation between lifetime earning and life expectancy.
Turning to normative approaches, the seminal papers of Feldstein (1985) and
(1987) were the first to discuss pension design with elementary OLG models. We
assume that workers with heterogeneous discount factors and a government with
a paternalistic social welfare function—originally suggested by Samuelson (1975).
Using our vocabulary, we might say that Feldstein (1985) proved the optimality
of the myopic rate for totally myopic workers. Calibrating an unrealistically high
real interest rate, however, he proved that otherwise at the social optimum, the
universal public pension should be eliminated. Next Feldstein (1987) proved that
in general the means-tested public system (a loose analogy to the capped system)
is socially preferable to a universal one.
Docquire (2002) improved Feldstein’s social welfare function, while Cremer, De
Donder, Maldonaldo and Pestieau (2008) simplified the analysis to a representa-
tive generation’s welfare. The latter paper introduced flexible labor supply, wage
heterogeneity and progressive pensions but made the distribution of wages and of
discount factors independent, moreover, took the efficiencies of public and private
savings equal.5
At this point it is worth comparing two approximations to the distribution of
the wage and discount pairs. It is true that in reality, there are not only low-paid
workers who are short-sighted and high-paid ones who are far-sighted (as in the
present paper) but also low-paid workers, who are far-sighted and high-paid ones
who are short-sighted (as in Cremer et al. 2008). Nevertheless, the correlation
between discount factors and wages appears to be strongly positive, therefore
the atypical combinations can be neglected in a first approximation. (Becker and
Mulligan (1997) provide a rich theory on the endogenous determination of time
preferences.) Cremer and Pestieau (2011) is an excellent survey of the field.6
Recently, Valde´s-Prieto and Schwarzhaupt (2011) analyzed the issue of the op-
timal coercion including the choice of cap. They considered a larger set of heuristics
on remaining life span and future needs than I do; furthermore, modeled various
pension systems. They put the value of the optimal cap near the 80th percentile
of the earning distribution.
Note that models of this type neglect real-life dynamic complications like growth,
inflation and population aging. Therefore, in our static model, we cannot consider
the dynamic problem of carving out a private pillar from a public one (Diamond
and Orszag, 2004 vs. Feldstein, 2005). Neither can we evaluate proposals like Dia-
mond and Orszag (2004) who would phase-in a 3% tax on incomes above the cap
the social welfare with respect to the maximum. At the same time, the weak progressivity of
the system becomes stronger.
4 In the US, the progressivity of the Social Security disappears above the cap. In Great
Britain of post-WWII the cap was set at the minimum wage, transforming the flat benefit
system into a flat contribution one, see also Example 1 below.
5 One can also argue that their flexible labor supply is replaced by more efficient private
saving in the present paper.
6 Studying lifetime income redistribution, Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010) connected the
incomes and discount factors and compared the welfarist and the paternalistic social optima.
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to reduce the long-term imbalance of the US Social Security. The problem of time-
inconsistency in private savings (e.g. Laibson, 1997 and Findley and Caliendo,
2009) is also out of scope, though the paternalistic government makes up this
omission. Most recently, Fehr, Kallweit and Kindermann (2013) analyzed related
pension design problems in a dynamic general equilibrium framework.7
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents
the OLG model of a proportional pension system with cap. Section 3 displays
numerical illustrations, showing the robustness and sensitivity of the qualitative
results to certain key parameter values. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
First we shall outline a framework, and then discuss the two versions of the model,
one without the cap, the other with a cap.
2.1 Framework
We consider a very simple pension model, where workers only differ in wages and
discount factors but their other characteristics do not vary with age. A type can
be described by his total wage w and his discount factor δ, the joint distribution
function of (w, δ) denoted by F and the corresponding expectations by E. Every-
body works for a unit period, and everybody spends a shorter (or equal) period
in retirement with a common length µ, 0 < µ ≤ 1. Workers pay contributions
τw up to τw¯, where τ is the contribution rate to the mandatory pension system
(0 < τ < 1) and w¯ is the wage ceiling or cap.8
We shall introduce the effective contribution rate τ˜ , which is the ratio of the
contribution to the wage. Distinguishing the wages below and above cap, we have
τ˜ =
{
τ if w ≤ w¯
τw¯/w < τ if w > w¯.
(1)
In a proportional system, the pension benefit is equal to the ratio of the con-
tribution τ˜w and the length ratio µ:
b = µ−1τ˜w. (2)
Since the two periods’ lengths are different, we use intensities, i.e. quantities
per a unit time period even if it is not always mentioned.
In addition to paying mandatory pension contributions, workers can also pri-
vately save for old-age: s ≥ 0. Denoting the compound interest factor by ρ > 1,
the intensity of the decumulated saving is approximately µ−1ρs.
7 It would be interesting to see how our partial equilibrium result change in their general
equilibrium model; for example, if the introduction of the cap raises savings, then the endoge-
nous interest rate diminishes, weakening the advantage of the cap.
8 The use of various control characters may seem superfluously complicated but in fact this
practice helps to understand the notations. For example, writing w¯ rather than an unrelated
parameter, e.g. θ reminds the reader that it is related to wage w.
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We can now describe the young and the old-age consumption (intensities):9
c = w − τ˜w − s and d = µ−1(τ˜w + ρs). (3)
To determine the individually optimal savings, we introduce a discounted lifetime
utility function:
U(w, δ, c, d) = u(c) + µδu(d), (4)
where u(·) is an increasing and concave per-period utility (felicity) function, u′(0) =
∞, u′(∞) = 0, and δ is the discount factor, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Inserting (3) into (4), the op-
timum condition is u′(c) = δρu′(d), the so-called Euler-equation. The transformed
equation
u′(w − τ˜w − s) = δρu′(µ−1(τ˜w + ρs) (5)
yields the optimal saving intention sˆ. We must distinguish two cases: either 1)
nonnegative saving intention or 2) negative saving intention. The saving intention
materializes if it is positive or zero; otherwise it turns to zero: s = max(sˆ, 0).
The function of the cap is as follows: lower-paid myopic workers can be locked
into a pension system with a high contribution rate, but higher-paid far-sighted
ones pay a lower effective rate. Note that there is no reason to set the cap below
the minimum wage wm, since by multiplying the contribution rate τ by a scalar:
w¯/wm < 1, resulting in τ
′ = τw¯/wm < τ , (τ, w¯) is equivalent to (τ ′, wm). Never-
theless, Figure 2 below includes the interval [0, wm] as well, to make room for our
basic case of no pension at all, when τ > 0. Similarly, if there is a finite maximal
wage wM , then any cap above wM can be reduced to wM without any impact, i.e.
no cap.
The optimal consumption pair are
c(τ, w¯, w, δ) = w− τ˜w−s(τ, w¯, w, δ), d(τ, w¯, w, δ) = µ−1[τ˜w+ρs(τ, w¯, w, δ)]. (6)
To obtain explicit results, Feldstein (1985), (1987) and Simonovits (2012) analyzed
two- and three-type models. We shall see that using a discrete wage and discount
factor distribution leads to a kinked social welfare function, the analysis of which
is cumbersome, even if it yields a closed-form solution. To avoid kinks, we shall
generally assume continuous wage and discount factor distributions. (Cremer et
al. (2008) worked with continuous wage distribution and binary discount factor
distribution.)
Let the discount factor δ(w) be a monotone increasing continuous function of
the wage w in the interval [wm, wM ] with 0 < wm < wM ≤ ∞. Let the wage
distribution have a positive density function f and a corresponding distribution
function F (w) with F (wm) = 0 and F (wM ) = 1. Furthermore, δm = δ(wm) and
δM = δ(wM ), 0 ≤ δm < δM ≤ 1. The social welfare function is utilitarian:10
V (τ, w¯) = EU∗[τ, w¯, w]→ max .
9 In a median voter model with a progressive pension system, Borck (2007) analytically
investigated the important problem when the life expectancy grows with income but at the
cost of distorting (3).
10 Using a Rawlsian social welfare function would defy the purpose of the study, rendering
the socially optimal cap indeterminate and the corresponding contribution rate myopic (cf.
(10) below)
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We shall denote the optimal pair by (τC , w¯C). For a given pair (τ, w¯), we shall
need the notion of critical wage wo = w(τ, w¯), which makes the saving intention
0: sˆ(τ, w¯, wo) = 0. If there is no such a wage, i.e. for a high enough contribution
rate, the saving intention is negative for any wage, then by definition, the critical
wage is identified with the maximal wage plus 1. For another given pair (w¯, w),
we can also speak of a critical contribution rate τo(w¯, w), defined by the implicit
equation sˆ(τo, w¯, w) = 0. Note that depending on the value of the contribution
rate, we must choose between the two branches of the consumption functions (6):
c(τ, w¯, w) =
{
(1− τ˜)w − s(τ, w¯, w) if τ < τo;
(1− τ˜)w if τ ≥ τo (7)
and
d(τ, w¯, w) =
{
µ−1(τ˜w + ρs(τ, w¯, w)) if τ < τo;
µ−1τ˜w if τ ≥ τo (8)
where τ˜ is the effective contribution rate introduced in (1).
To go forward, first we shall consider the simpler, capless system, and then the
more complex, capped one.
2.2 Capless pension system
If w¯ = wM , then the government chooses the contribution rate τ to maximize the
expected value of the paternalistic, undiscounted indirect utility functions, i.e.
V [τ ] = EU∗[τ, w]→ max .
We shall denote the (sub)optimal contribution rate by τN (no cap).
To understand the behavior of V [τ ], first we fix an arbitrary wage, and with
the fixed wage, we shall study the simpler, second branch U∗2 . Substitute (7b)–(8b)
into the paternalistic utility function:
U∗2 [τ, w] = u((1− τ)w) + µu(µ−1τw). (9)
Take its partial derivative with respect to the contribution rate:
U∗2
′
τ [τ, w] = −wu′((1− τ)w) + wu′(µ−1τw).
It is easy to see that this becomes zero just when nobody saves and the government
equalizes the consumption intensities of the young and of the old:
(1− τ)w = µ−1τw, i.e. τ¯ = 1
1 + µ−1
. (10)
We shall call this contribution rate myopic, since this is the social optimum for
totally myopic workers in a capless system. Note, however, that in a system with
a low cap, it may be reasonable to choose a contribution rate above the myopic
rate (see Figure 1 above)!
We have arrived to
Lemma 1 The zero-saving paternalistic utility function U∗2 [τ, w] in (9) is increasing
in [0, τ¯) and decreasing in (τ¯ , 1).
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Turning to the first branch,
U∗1 [τ, w] = u((1− τ)w − s[τ, w]) + µu(µ−1(τw + ρs[τ, w]), s[τ, w] > 0. (11)
Take its derivative with respect to τ :
U∗1
′
τ [τ, w] = −(w+s′τ [τ, w])u′((1−τ)w−s[τ, w])+(w+ρs′τ [τ, w])u′(µ−1(τw+ρs[τ, w]).
Here s′τ [τ, w] < 0. For c > d, u′(c) < u′(d) and for ρ > 1, the absolute value of the
multiplier of u′(c) is lower than that of u′(d). Hence U∗1
′
τ [τ, w] < 0.
We have arrived to
Lemma 2 The paternalistic utility function U∗1 [τ, w] in (11) with positive saving is
decreasing in [0, τo[w]) and is increasing in (τo[w], 1).
Although under normal circumstances, τo[w] < τ¯ holds, complex dependence
can arise after taking expectations of U∗[τ, w]. For sufficiently myopic workers, the
myopic contribution rate would be optimal; for sufficiently far-sighted workers, the
zero contribution rate would be optimal.
Theorem 1 a) If everybody is totally myopic: δ ≡ 0, then the social welfare is an
increasing function of the contribution rate in [0, τ¯) and decreasing in (τ¯ , 1), having
the optimum at τ¯ : τN = τ¯ . b) If everybody is totally far-sighted: δ ≡ 1, then the social
welfare is a decreasing function of the contribution rate in [0, 1), therefore the social
optimum is no-pension: τN = 0. c) In the remaining cases, 0 ≤ τN ≤ τ¯ .
Remark 1 Feldstein (1985, Section 1) proved similar results for Cobb–Douglas-
utility functions.
Proof See Lemmas 1 and 2.
In general, there are three domains in the parameter space of the model: 1)
where τN = τ¯ , 2) where 0 < τN < τ¯ , 3) where τN = 0. In domains 1 and 2,
the government must choose a high enough contribution rate to jump the welfare
gap arising because the welfare function is decreasing for low enough contribution
rates. From now on we assume that this is the case. We cannot determine its
condition in general, in terms of the primitive data of the model but we can give a
rather trivial condition when the myopic contribution rate provides higher welfare
than the zero rate does. Simply substituting into (11) (τ = τ¯) and (9) (τ = 0),
respectively and taking expectations yields
Theorem 2 The pension system with myopic contribution rate is welfare superior to
the no pension if and only if
(1 + µ)Eu(w/(1 + µ)) > Eu(w − s[0, w]) + µEu(µ−1ρs[0, w]), (12)
where s[0, w] is the optimal saving function defined in (5) above.
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2.3 Return to the capped pension system
Having studied the capless system, we return now to the capped system: wm ≤ w¯ ≤
wM ≤ ∞ and wm < wM . We start with two elementary observations presented as
one theorem and one conjecture. The following theorem states that for high enough
contribution rates, introducing an appropriate cap, the social welfare can be raised.
Theorem 3 Choosing the socially suboptimal contribution rate τN (the conditional
optimum in the capless system), and introducing a cap equaling to the critical wage
wo[τN ], the social welfare is increased:
V (τN , w
o[τN ]) > V (τN , wM ) = V [τN ].
Proof By definition, the introduction of this cap into the capless system, affects
exactly those workers, who earn above the critical wage wo[τN ], and they would
save from their newly found disposable wage more efficiently than they did in the
mandatory public system.
Remark 2 Note that if the contribution rate were lower than the suboptimal value
or the cap were lower than the critical wage, then the introduction of the corre-
sponding cap would reduce the paternalistic welfare of those who earn close but
below the critical wage. In both cases, complicated calculation would be needed
to judge the welfare implications.
Next we formulate a conjecture comparing the optimal contribution rates of
the capless and the capped systems and providing an upper bound on the optimal
cap.
Conjecture 1 Assume that the share of well-paid far-sighted workers is sufficiently
high that the suboptimal contribution rate in the capless system be lower than
the myopic rate: 0 ≤ τN < τ¯ . Then the socially optimal contribution rate is higher
than the suboptimum: τC > τN and the optimal cap is lower than the critical wage
in the capless system: w¯C < w
o[τN ].
The easiest way to visualize the conjecture is as follows: raise the cap w¯ con-
tinuously from wm to wM and determine the conditionally optimal contribution
rate τ [w¯]. One expects that the resulting function τ [w¯] is decreasing and before
reaching τN it goes through the unconditionally optimal τC at the corresponding
cap w¯C .
Figure 1 above shows, however, that the conditionally optimal contribution rate
can be even higher than the myopic one, at least for low enough caps: τ [w¯] > τ¯ .
In such cases, however, system (τ [w¯], w¯) can be Pareto-improved with a system
of myopic rate and an appropriately raised cap w∗ = τ [w¯]w¯/τ¯ . In fact, workers
earning below w∗ need not pay effective contribution rates above the myopic one,
and the others pay the same rate as in the former one.
Making a detour and leaving the realm of the continuous distributions, we
outline the simplest case, namely when there are only two types.
Example 1 (Two types) Let us assume that there are only two types, m and M
with wages wm and wM , wm < 1 < wM and δm = 0 and δM ≤ 1. Let fm > 0 and
fM > 0 be the relative frequencies of these types, fm + fM = 1. Then sm = 0 and
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sM > 0 for any 0 < τ < τ¯ . Denoting the socially (sub)optimal contribution rates
in the capless and the capped systems by τN and τC with the socially optimal cap
w¯C , respectively, the optimal contribution rate is higher than the suboptimal one
and the optimal cap is equal to the minimal wage:
τN < τC < τ¯ and w¯C = wm.
This is a glaring but degenerate example of the claim presented in Conjecture
above.
2.4 Cobb–Douglas-utility function
To sharpen our results above and prepare for the numerical calculations, we spe-
cialize on a Cobb–Douglas-utility function (cf. Feldstein, 1985): u(x) = log x. Then
our formulas (e.g. (5)) simplify as follows:
sˆ[τ, w] =
δ(w)ρ(1− τ)− µ−1τ
[δ(w) + µ−1]ρ
w, c(τ, w, δ(w)) =
1− (1− ρ−1)τ
1 + µδ(w)
w, w > w[τ ].
Hence the critical wage wo[τ ] is a root to δ(w) = τ/[µρ(1 − τ)]. If there is a cap,
then τ is replaced by τ˜ .
For this special case, everything is very simple. Most noteworthy, Theorem 1
can be generalized as follows. For a moment forget about the dependence of the
discount factor on wage and introduce the critical discount factor δo for which the
paternalistic utility function’s two end-values, namely V [0] and V [τ¯ ] are equal to
each other:
log c(0, w, δo) + µ log d(0, w, δo) = log c(τ¯ , w) + µ log d(τ¯ , w).
Because the optimal consumptions are proportional to wages, the critical discount
factor is independent of the wage:
log c(0, 1, δo) + µ log d(0, 1, δo) = log c(τ¯ , 1) + µ log d(τ¯ , 1).
Returning to wage-dependent discount factors, now Theorem 1 on a capless system
is transformed into
Theorem 4 Assume that the workers have Cobb–Douglas-utility functions with wage-
dependent discount factors δ(w)s. a) If everybody is sufficiently myopic (subcritical):
δ(wM ) < δ
o, then the social welfare is an increasing function of the contribution rate
in [0, τ¯) and decreasing in (τ¯ , 1), having the optimum at the myopic rate τ¯ . b) If
everybody is sufficiently far-sighted (supercritical): δ(wm) > δ
o, then the social welfare
is a decreasing function of the contribution rate in [0, 1), therefore the social optimum
is no-pension at all. c) If there are both subcritical and supercritical workers: δ(wm) <
δo < δ(wM ), then the optimal contribution rate is between the two extrema: 0 ≤ τN ≤
τ¯ .
Similarly, Theorem 2 is transformed into
Theorem 5 Under the assumption of Theorem 4, the pension with myopic contribu-
tion rate is welfare superior to the no pension if and only if
(1 + µ) log(1 + µ) + µ log ρ+ µE log δ(w) < (1 + µ)E log(1 + µδ(w)). (13)
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Proof Indeed, inserting
c(0, w, δ(w)) =
w
1 + µδ(w)
and d(0, w, δ(w)) = δ(w)ρc(0, w, δ(w))
into (12), simplifies to (13).
We have no analog to Theorem 3.
It is not enough to determine the social optimum, we must evaluate the effi-
ciency gain of having a pension system (τ, w¯) rather than having no pension at
all. We formulate the relative efficiency ε of system (τ, w¯) with respect to no pen-
sion system as follows: V [ε, 0, 0] = V [1, τ, w¯].11 Due to our choice of Cobb–Douglas
utility function, (1 + µ) log ε can be separated in the LHS, i.e.
V [1, 0, 0] + (1 + µ) log ε = V [1, τ, w¯], i.e. ε = exp
V [1, τ, w¯]− V [1, 0, 0]
1 + µ
.
2.5 Pareto-distribution
We assume that wages follow a Pareto-distribution with a density function
f(w) = σwσmw
−1−σ for w ≥ wm > 0,
where σ > 1 is the exponent of the distribution and wm is the minimum wage. It
is easy to give an explicit formula for the distribution function:
F (w) =
∫ w
wm
f(ω) dω = 1− wσmw−σ for w ≥ wm > 0. (14)
Hence F (wm) = 0 and F (∞) = 1, and its expectation can explicitly be calculated:
Ew =
∫ ∞
wm
wf(w) dw =
σwm
σ − 1 .
Since we normalized the expected wage as unity, the minimum wage is given as
wm =
σ − 1
σ
.
In practice, σ ≈ 2, therefore wm ≈ 1/2. We also display the second moment of the
Pareto-distribution:
Ew2 =
σw2m
σ − 2 =
(σ − 1)2
σ(σ − 2) for σ > 2 and Ew
2 =∞ otherwise.
For our unbounded distribution, let wQ be the maximal value at which the
wage distribution is cut in the numerical illustrations and we represent all the
wages above wQ by a cleverly chosen wK . By definition,
1 =
∫ wQ
wm
wf(w) dw + [1− F (wQ)]wK . (15)
11 Note that for zero contribution rate, the value of the cap is as irrelevant as for zero cap,
the value of the contribution rate. Therefore V [ε, τ, 0] = V [ε, 0, w¯] = V [ε, 0, 0].
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The expected covered wage (given in the integral in (15)) is equal to
E min(w,wQ) = 1−
wσmw
−σ+1
Q
σ − 1 , (16)
hence (14), (15) and (16) yield
wK =
σ
σ − 1wQ.
For example, for σ = 2, the representative highest wage is double of the “maxi-
mum”: wK = 2wQ.
3 Numerical illustrations
Even though our framework is very elementary, our problem is quite involved ana-
lytically, therefore we turn to numerical illustrations. First we make the necessary
preparations, then we display our tables for the capless and the capped systems,
respectively.
3.1 Preparations
We have distinguished the lengths of the working and of the retirement periods
but we have confined attention to a stationary population and economy! (If we
had complicated the model by introducing the growth factors of population ν and
of wage g, then we should have calculated with a relative interest factor: ρ/(νg).)
Assuming 40-year working and 20-year retirement periods, the length-ratio is 1/2
rather than 1. This way, we receive more realistic numbers. For example, even in
our stationary economy and population, the myopic contribution rate τ¯ = 1/(1 +
µ−1) in (10) drops from 1/2 to 1/3 as we replace µ = 1 by 0.5.12 We calculate as if
the whole saving and dissaving occurred at the middle points of the working and
retirement periods, namely at adult ages 20 and 50 years, respectively.
We start with the tabulation of the critical discount factor as a function of
the interest factor. Recall that for workers with subcritical discount factors (where
the saving intention is negative), the myopic contribution rate is optimal; while
for workers with supercritical discount factors (where the saving intention is non-
negative), the zero contribution rate is optimal (cf. Theorem 4). It is qualitatively
obvious that the higher the interest factor, the more advantageous is to save, i.e.
the lower is the critical discount factor. What Table 1 gives is the quantitative
estimation. For example, for the modest annual interest factor of 1.02, the critical
annual discount factor is quite high: δo[1] = 0.952, while for the super high an-
nual interest factor of 1.08, the critical annual discount factor is quite low: 0.891.
Table 1. Critical discount factor as a function of interest factor
Annual interest factor ρ[1] 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.08
Annual critical discount factor
δo[1]
0.952 0.928 0.909 0.891
12 If we took into account that the socially optimal discount factor is less than one (e.g. labor
disutility, reduced family size in old-age, etc., as postulated by Cremer et al. (2008)), then we
could reduce the contribution rate further, even to 1/4.
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Note that for Feldstein’s parametrization, where ρ[1] = 1.114, δ = 1, the so-
cially optimal τ = 0 yields d = ρc = 25.5c, a totally unrealistic ratio.
We shall assume that wages are distributed along a Pareto-distribution. To give
a flavor of the behavior of the Pareto-2 distribution, we display selected values of
the distribution function and the share of covered earnings. The median wage is
about 0.71. Note how fast the probability of being fully covered converges to 1 as
the relative value of the cap goes to 4, and how slowly the share of the covered
earnings does so. For example, 1.6% of all the earners still have 12.5% of the total
earnings (last row).
Table 2. Pareto-probabilities and covered earnings for varying caps
Earning cap Probability of being
fully covered
Share of covered
earnings
w¯ F (w¯) F (w¯)E(w|w < w¯)
0.707 (median) 0.500 0.250
1.0 (average) 0.750 0.500
1.5 0.889 0.667
2.0 0.938 0.750
2.5 0.960 0.800
3.0 0.972 0.833
4.0 0.984 0.875
Remark. σ = 2.
Recall that in our model, the discount factor is an increasing function of the
wage: δ = δ(w). To map an infinite interval into a finite one, we assume the simple
relation
δ(w) = δM − (δM − δm)eξ(wm−w)
where ξ > 0 measures the dependence of the discount factor on the wage, shortly
and imprecisely, elasticity. Note that for any finite wQ, δ(wQ) < δM , but for high
wQ/wm, the error is small. We shall work with δm = 0, δM = 1. For this special
choice, δ(w) = 1− eξ(wm−w), i.e. ξ = −δ′(w)/(1− δ(w)) is something of a discount
factor–wage elasticity. When fixed, we shall work with ξ = 0.2.13
In the remainder we shall investigate the sensitivity of the social optimum to
the parameter values, namely to the wage elasticity of the discounting factor and
to the interest factor.
3.2 (Sub)optimal contribution rate without cap
We start our numerical investigations with the socially (sub)optimal contribution
rate in a capless system. Note that for ξ = 0, every worker would be totally myopic,
therefore by Theorem 1a, nobody would save, thus the myopic contribution rate
13 We shall divide the interval [wm, wQ] into n = 100 subintervals such a way that the
division points wi form a geometrical sequence. At integration, the representative points are
the geometrical means of the subsequent points: wi+1 = qwi and zi =
√
wiwi+1. The mass of
the remaining infinite part is 1 − F (wQ) = 0.0001 with wQ = 50 and the earning wK = 100
represents the average highest wage.
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would be optimal. Fixing first the annual interest factor as ρ[1] = 1.04, Table 3
shows that as the discount factor–wage elasticity ξ rises from 0.1 to 0.7, the socially
(sub)optimal contribution rate sinks from 0.330 to 0.235, and the corresponding
net replacement rate β = b/[(1−τ˜)w]—where τ˜ stands for the effective contribution
rate—drops from 0.985 to 0.614. (τ¯ = 1/3 and τN = 1/3 for ξ = 0.) The relative
efficiency with respect to no pension drops from 1.74 to 1.05.
Table 3. Socially (sub)optimal contribution rates, changing elasticity
Wage elastic-
ity of discount
factor
(Sub)optimal
contribution
rate
Net replace-
ment rate
Relative effi-
ciency
Expected sav-
ing
ξ τN β ε EsN
0.1 0.330 0.985 1.738 0.007
0.2 0.324 0.959 1.417 0.015
0.3 0.312 0.907 1.269 0.024
0.4 0.299 0.853 1.181 0.033
0.5 0.282 0.786 1.122 0.042
0.6 0.263 0.714 1.080 0.053
0.7 0.235 0.614 1.049 0.066
Remark. ρ[1] = 1.04. In Table 4, we discuss the sensitivity of the outcomes to the
interest factor for a fixed elasticity ξ = 0.2. As the annual interest factor ρ[1] rises
from 1.02 to 1.08, the socially (sub)optimal contribution rate τN drops from 0.332
to 0.198 and the corresponding net replacement rate sinks from 0.994 to 0.498
Note, however, that higher interest factors are unrealistic and produce too high
consumption ratio d/c = ρ for w ≈ wM . The relative efficiency drops from 1.72 to
1.03.
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Table 4. The socially (sub)optimal rates, changing interest factor
Annual inter-
est factor
(Sub)optimal
contribution
rate
Net replace-
ment rate
Relative effi-
ciency
Expected sav-
ing
ρ[1] τN β ε EsN
1.02 0.332 0.994 1.716 0.007
1.03 0.329 0.981 1.557 0.011
1.04 0.324 0.959 1.416 0.017
1.05 0.312 0.907 1.291 0.023
1.06 0.291 0.821 1.182 0.030
1.07 0.261 0.706 1.087 0.039
1.08 0.198 0.494 1.030 0.051
Remark. ξ = 0.2.
3.3 Optimal contribution rate and cap
Extending the calculations on the capless system to the capped system and anti-
cipating Tables 5 and 6, we present Figure 2. This displays the dependency of the
relative efficiency ε on the cap with the approximate constant optimal contribution
rate τC = 0.33; for ρ[1] = 1.04 and ξ = 0.2. Note that in this example, we allow
for caps below the minimum wage, when every worker pays the same contribution.
That way we can present the no pension even at the myopic contribution rate.
The relative efficiency quickly rises from 1 at zero cap (no pension) till 1.41 at
the minimum wage w¯ = 0.5, it reaches its maximum 1.433 at the average wage
and then slowly declines to 1.417. Note that the numerical difference between the
capped and the capless systems does not appear to be significant, but—as has
been mentioned in the Introduction—this is typical in such calculations.
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We repeat the sensitivity analysis, and the impacts on the optima rather than
suboptima of elasticity and of interest factor are displayed in Tables 5 and 6,
respectively. Comparing Table 5 to Table 3, our conjecture is “confirmed”, at
least in this numerical case. When ξ rises from 0.1 to 0.7, the socially opti-
mal contribution rate stays close to the myopic one rather than dropping, while
the corresponding cap drops from 1.46 to 0.5. This is the quantitative reflec-
tion of our qualitative idea: the higher the share of far-sighted workers in the
population, the less is the need for mandatory saving; but to defend the re-
maining myopes, the statutory contribution rate remains high. Here we also dis-
play the relative efficiency of the capped system: it sinks from 1.74 to 1.09.
Table 5. The impact of elasticity on the socially optimal cap
Wage elas-
ticity of
discount
factor
Contribution
rate
Optimal cap Relative
efficiency
Expected
saving
ξ τ w¯C ε EsC
0.1 0.333 1.46 1.745 0.028
0.2 0.333 0.92 1.433 0.048
0.3 0.333 0.70 1.294 0.065
0.4 0.333 0.61 1.212 0.079
0.5 0.335 0.55 1.158 0.090
0.6 0.330 0.51 1.119 0.100
0.7 0.321 0.50 1.090 0.109
Remark
ρ[1] = 1.04.
Finally, we check the impact of the annual interest factor ρ[1] for a fixed elas-
ticity, again ξ = 0.2. As the interest factor rises from 1.02 to 1.08 in Table 6, the
socially optimal contribution rate drops slowly but then suddenly from 0.333 to
0.30. The decrease in the corresponding cap starts immediately: from 1.72 to 1.19
and then to the minimum wage: 0.5. This is the quantitative reflection of another
of our qualitative ideas: the more efficient the private saving, the less is the need
for mandatory saving. Unlike Table 5, in this case, the contribution rate and the
cap drop together. The efficiency of the capped system declines from 1.72 to 1.08.
Table 6. The impact of interest factor on the socially optimal cap
Annual inter-
est factor
Contribution
rate
Optimal cap Relative
efficiency
Expected
saving
ρ τ w¯C ε EsC
1.02 0.333 1.72 1.720 0.033
1.03 0.333 1.19 1.566 0.041
1.04 0.333 0.92 1.433 0.048
1.05 0.333 0.72 1.320 0.055
1.06 0.332 0.59 1.224 0.060
1.07 0.330 0.51 1.145 0.064
1.08 0.300 0.50 1.080 0.067
Remark.
ξ = 0.2.
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It is an unfortunate feature of our numerical experiments that either the capless
suboptimal contribution rate is almost myopic or the optimal cap is close to the
minimum wage. To display the full power of our Conjecture we would need an
example, where the capless suboptimum is far from the myopic rate: τN  τ¯ and
the optimal cap is far from the minimum wage: w¯C  wm.
We have not yet commented the changes in the expected saving as a result of
imposing a cap (last columns of Tables 3 vs. 5 and Tables 4 vs. 6). Typically the
socially optimal expected saving is higher than the suboptimal one: EsC > EsN .
In summary, some results (especially on the optimal contribution rate) are
quite robust, while other results (notably on the socially optimal cap) are very
sensitive to the key parameters of the model, namely to the discount factor–wage
elasticity (ξ) and the interest factor (ρ).
4 Conclusions
We have constructed a very simple model of the proportional pension system
to analyze the impact of the socially optimal contribution rate and especially of
the contribution (base) cap on the social welfare (and private savings). We have
concentrated on the contradiction between the needs of low-earning and myopic
workers and of high-earning and far-sighted ones: the former need a high con-
tribution rate to make up for their low saving intentions; the latter need a low
contribution rate to make room for their high and efficient saving. For low enough
wage-elasticities of discount factor and interest factors, the socially optimal con-
tribution rate in a capless system is close to the myopic one, approaching the
old-age consumption of the lower-paid shorter-sighted to their young-age one. For
other cases, the scissors between young-age and old-age consumptions of the high-
earners grow wide. A politically convenient compromise is the introduction of an
appropriate cap on the contribution: a well-chosen cap does not diminish the con-
tribution as well as the utility of the myopes but relieves the far-sighted from a
part of the contribution burden.
This model is just the beginning. It neglects very important issues: the hetero-
geneity of the life spans and of the interest factors. In fact, the expected life span
and the interest factor rise with lifetime wages (cf. Borck, 2007). This may suggest
the introduction of progressive pension systems, for example, the proportional part
is complemented by a uniform basic benefit. Then the analysis of the progressive
personal income tax also comes to the fore. The flexibility of the labor supply
and the underreporting of the true labor income are other important issues, which
have been studied with other, related elementary models (Cremer et al., (2008)
and Simonovits (2009)).
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